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Book Review
Herbert Butterﬁeld and the Interpretation of History by Keith C. Sewell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005)
280 pp., including bibliographies and an index. ISBN 1-4039-3928-4. $74.95. Reviewed by Harry Van
Dyke, Professor of History Emeritus, Redeemer University College.
Professor Keith Sewell’s bulky doctoral dissertation,
now packaged in a manageable and attractive book of 12
lucid chapters, is an important study of a body of literature that must be considered intensely relevant for critical
reﬂection on two areas of academic work: the science of
history and the humanities in general. The book examines successive stages in the development of the thought
of Butterﬁeld in relation to fundamental issues in the historical discipline. Sir Herbert Butterﬁeld (1900-1979) was
a Christian historian teaching in Cambridge; his proliﬁc
output included such classics as The Whig Interpretation of
History, The Origins of Modern Science, and Christianity and
History. His English colleagues always took note of his
publications, and on this continent he has been studied and
commented on by such authors as C. T. McIntire, William
A. Speck, and Kenneth W. Thompson.
Sewell has produced a sympathetic reconstruction of
Butterﬁeld’s thought. This work is based on a painstaking
analysis of the entire published Butterﬁeld corpus, along
with a judicious canvassing of the unpublished correspondence and manuscripts deposited with the Butterﬁeld
Papers in the Cambridge University Library. The reader can
be certain that nothing essential has been left unexamined.
In a carefully nuanced way, Sewell lays bare the unspoken
motivations and hidden tensions in Butterﬁeld’s continual
debates, both with himself and with a host of contemporary historians in the period between 1924-1979. In particular, the concept for which Butterﬁeld is widely known,
“technical history,” is tracked down in his many writings,
showing its initial purport, its gradual metamorphosis, and
its ﬁnal integration (however problematic) in the whole of
Butterﬁeld’s thought. In a chronological-genetic approach
that is comprehensive ( if not to say exhaustive), Sewell
traces the steps by which Butterﬁeld, despite his championing of non-interpretative “technical” history, employed
deep-seated presuppositions and, more signiﬁcantly,
the reasons that he did so each time. The problem with
Butterﬁeld—and here Sewell appears to agree with the
conclusion of Louis J. Voskuil—is that he posited “a formal dualism between technical history and religious interpretation which tended to preclude consideration of their
inner connection” (12). The lynchpin of Sewell’s critique
is contained in a single sentence: “Evidence is never just
seen, as Butterﬁeld tends on occasion to imply; it is always
seen as” (215). The ﬁnal conclusion of this study is that
Butterﬁeld, in spite of himself and in spite of his methodological principles, was never able to escape the use of
presuppositions in doing his work as a historian (213).
Can anyone trained in the reformational thought
stemming from Kuyper, Dooyeweerd, and others be sur-

prised by this conclusion? Long before the Sociology of
Knowledge became a household word, Abraham Kuyper,
in the great parliamentary debates of 1904, defended
the inescapability of subjective interpretation and therefore the perfect validity of worldview-directed university
studies, such as those given at the Free University, against
the charge by Leyden professor Van der Vlugt that such
studies were unacceptably “sectarian.” And decades before Critical Theory occupied Western epistemologists,
Herman Dooyeweerd launched his transcendental critique
of theoretic thought against the charge that while humanist presuppositions in scientiﬁc work are rational, Christian
presuppositions are “unscientiﬁc.” And, to name one
more, independently of postmodernism’s literary theorists
and their call for deconstructing texts, S. U. Zuidema specialized in unmasking “the hidden player on the keyboard
of a thinker’s philosophy.” No, Sewell’s conclusion does
not surprise us. What does surprise us is that he has to add
that, although Butterﬁeld gradually went over to a more
perspectival view of scientiﬁc knowledge, he never “explicitly retracted his earlier teaching on ‘technical history’
. . .” and never “successfully confronted the ineluctability
of interpretation” (14, 213).
Butterﬁeld’s initial formulation of his concept of
“technical history” resembled a view of scholarship or a
philosophy of science known as “naive realism.” Sewell
shows, however, that in his own actual work as a practicing historian, this erudite scholar was anything but naive!
Butterﬁeld had a profound understanding of human nature
and the complexity of the historical process, and his historical writings are richly textured, didactic and evocative,
allusive and suggestive. Yet over the years his pronouncements on theory and methodology wove a tangled web.
The present analysis deftly handles the twists and turns in
Butterﬁeld’s emerging overall conception. Faced with the
perennial questions about history and culture, he struggled
to do them justice but repeatedly got himself entangled in
inconsistencies and partial retractions expressed in vague,
obscure, at times tortuous prose.
It appears that Butterﬁeld felt obliged to protect the
integrity of historical science against the ideological onslaughts on the discipline by Marxists and other utilitarian
propagandists. Sewell devotes all of Chapter 8 to this issue. In Butterﬁeld’s eyes, interpretation often lapses into
misrepresenting, distorting, and oversimplifying historical
reality. Hence it must be barred from academic history.
In taking this stance Butterﬁeld was for a while deceived
by a particular reading, common in the English-speaking world for close to a century, of Leopold von Ranke.
Ranke’s celebrated method was understood to mean that
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respectable scientiﬁc history must limit itself to establishing naked facts and discrete events for the sake of arriving at “pure science” free from overarching interpretations
extraneous to the evidence. Sewell notes that Butterﬁeld
imputes to Ranke “an almost Baconian notion of factuality” (168; see also 114). Could it be, I have often wondered, that this Baconianism, together with the Occamist
emphasis on discreteness independent of general categories, became part of a long-standing English intellectual
tradition? And could it be that Butterﬁeld accordingly entertained an undue respect for the rise of modern science?
Nothing startled me as much, and in the end convinced
me as little, as the statement in his book on the subject
that the Scientiﬁc Revolution “outshines everything since
the rise of Christianity and reduces the Renaissance and
Reformation to the rank of mere episodes”(vii).
Butterﬁeld’s approach matured as he began to recognize Ranke’s emphasis on collective tendencies and universal patterns and learned to incorporate these, however
haltingly and falteringly, in his theorizing about proper
methodology (not that he had not practiced this broader
vision in his own historical writings all along). A distinct
merit of this study is that we are shown in what sense
Butterﬁeld’s professional practice as a historian was much
better—far richer—than his theory warranted. As Sewell
remarks, Butterﬁeld was a subtle thinker but not a very
systematic one. The beauty of his pilgrimage through the
thorny paths of historiographical theory is that time and
again shaky theoretical expositions were offset by tacit
self-corrections and increasingly more satisfactory elaborations, in line with his own historical writings, of what
historians are doing and should be doing.
The story of this struggle, covering half a century,
is fascinating. Butterﬁeld got caught in a tangle, carefully
unraveled by Sewell, because he was a better historian
than a philosopher and a better believer than an academic
conformist. The tangle arose, Sewell explains in a merciful understatement, “out of his Christian, but conceptually inadequate, response to positions that he did not share
and perhaps uncritical appropriation of epistemological
assumptions and methodological precepts that were not
wholly compatible with his Christian worldview” (14).
Butterﬁeld’s inability to ignore the presence of a divine order in the historical process—a providential order woven
into the very fabric of history—and his unwillingness to
suppress his view of man as a fallen and ﬂawed creature,
simply did not allow him to conﬁne himself to a value-free,
non-interpretative zone insulated against “subjective interpretation,” which transcends empirically veriﬁable facts,
i.e. to conﬁne himself to the restricted kind of narrative
prescribed by “technical history” as he had ﬁrst deﬁned it.
As a result, the kind of history he wrote as the years went
by became more and more what Sewell calls “expository
historiography” (see Chapter 5). This is a kind of historywriting that does not shy away from general concepts, patterns of interpretation, long-term consequences, and even
moral judgments.
In this process of articulating and constantly reformulating his views, Butterﬁeld at one point used the metaphor
of “thinking caps”—three distinct mental approaches or
vantage points that the historian may adopt as the narrative
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requires: factual, interpretative, or confessional. These too,
however, did not prove to be the felicitous constructs that
could ﬁnally resolve the inner tensions in his basic conception. In fact, he was forced to redeﬁne his constructs several times in a vain attempt to safeguard the historian’s prime
role as he persisted in seeing it, namely to collect facts with
an open mind free of any “superimposed interpretation.”
In this connection, Sewell cautions that McIntire’s generous interpretation of Butterﬁeld is in need of emendation
(12, 204). Sewell also seems to appreciate Hayden White’s
analysis of the explanatory patterns employed by historians, but he adds, wryly and wisely, “Perhaps the latter
would have been more relevant for the present study if he
had addressed the fundamental question of religious perspective rather than having discussed the issue principally
in terms of literary metaphors” (7). In another delightful
aside, Sewell records that while Thomas Kuhn explicitly
credited Butterﬁeld and his “thinking-cap” thesis for his
own discovery of ruling paradigms in the history of natural science (13, 163), Butterﬁeld himself in turn credited
his inspiration for the idea to the indeterminacy principle
in physics as expounded by Werner Heisenberg during a
visit to Cambridge (161 n. 49).
As we follow Sewell’s tracing of the many metamorphoses undergone by Butterﬁeld’s conception, we do well
to bear in mind that this great British historian was the
product of the classic system in vogue in the British university: you write weekly papers for your tutor, for you
learn as you write and you write in order to learn. The typical English don has taken a page from John Calvin, a man
steeped in the pedagogy of Renaissance Humanism who
wrote at the bottom of his preface to the Institutes, quoting St. Augustine, “I confess that I am one of those who
write as they grow in knowledge and who grow in knowledge as they write.” With some people this work habit, for
better or worse, results in an enormous output of texts.
McIntire has described the vastness of Butterﬁeld’s literary
remains. But the obvious fact that manuscripts are not always ripe for publication became clear in the critical reception accorded Butterﬁeld’s posthumous book The Origins of
History, edited by his long-time friend Adam Watson.
Sewell’s book reads well, but I deplore the absence of
subheadings within each chapter, which can be so helpful
for the reader to keep his bearings. Equally deplorable, to
my taste, is the absence of all annotation at the foot of
the page: we have to settle for thirty-ﬁve continuous pages
of endnotes (217-251); one would think that modern electronic typesetting has made this awkward convention unnecessary.
The strengths of this study are obvious, and I hasten
to enumerate them. The work subjects Butterﬁeld to an
impartial yet critical evaluation, teasing out the basic intentions of the man without pinning him down on a procrustean bed of apriori theoretical distinctions. Butterﬁeld is
treated as a scholar of integrity yet with serious philosophical blindspots. Particularly illuminating of the questions
at issue are the many interactions with other historians of
which Sewell cites copious portions; we are given intriguing glimpses into the world of British historians of the
twentieth century, from Acton, Temperley, and Gooch to
Trevelyan, Namier, and Carr, and we can read their reac-

tions to Butterﬁeld and to one another about him, both in
the public press and in private correspondence. Another
decided strength is that Butterﬁeld is allowed to speak
for himself in lengthy quotations from his many works.
Granted, a plethora of direct quotations is usually frowned
upon and can be tiresome; in this case, however, one is
dealing with a study in historical writing, and I would agree
with Sewell that one needs to see just what Butterﬁeld
actually wrote (9f., 15). Nothing illustrates Butterﬁeld’s
thought processes and his “second thoughts” and “reconsiderations” better than ipsissima verba.
The appended Bibliographies are a gold mine. The
one that lists works by Butterﬁeld supersedes the extensive
ones by Partington (1963) and Hinton (1972) and the categorial ones by McIntire (1979) and Thompson (1980).

A ﬁnal strength, surely, is the avoidance of technical
jargon. Any intelligent reader of this study can follow what
the professional historians are talking about. Accordingly,
the book will be of enduring value to historians interested
in the foundational questions of their discipline—and
how could they not be interested in them?—as well as to
philosophers and theoreticians of history. It will also be
found exceedingly insightful by students of historiography
and political theory. Its subject matter will remain topical
because historiographical debates tend to have a long life
span. Butterﬁeld has been out of fashion for some time,
but now that the inroads of postmodernism have come to
a halt and are beginning to recede, Butterﬁeld is due for
renewed attention. My expectation is that Herbert Butterﬁeld
and the Interpretation of History will long remain a stimulating
and instructive guide.
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